Miss Justice Finlay Geoghegan, in a judgment of 26 March 2014, refused an interlocutory application by the plaintiff seeking to (1) restrain the termination of his employment and (2) restrain the defendants from terminating an alleged partnership. 

A meeting took place between the plaintiff and the first named defendant on 11 December 2013 to discuss certain issues which had arisen. There was some dispute as to the exact facts of the meeting. The plaintiff alleged that he understood that he was to be put on paid leave for a month and that the issues raised in the meeting, including what was described by Miss Justice Finlay Geoghegan as the ‘Facebook issue’, would be looked at in one month. However the plaintiff acknowledged that the first named defendant had said that he did not want to work with the plaintiff again. The first named defendant alleged that he told the plaintiff that he was being dismissed and that the company would pay him 4 weeks’ salary on certain conditions. 

An interlocutory motion was issued by the plaintiff in January 2014 seeking to restrain the termination of the plaintiff’s employment and the termination of the alleged partnership. At the hearing of the interlocutory motion, the defendants gave a number of undertakings to the Court, including that they would not dismiss the plaintiff for misconduct (which included the matters raised by the first named defendant in the meeting of 11 December 2013 and the Facebook issue) pending the determination of the claim. 

The plaintiff’s case was that as the result of the meeting of 11 December 2013 and subsequent third party communications was that plaintiff was to be dismissed for alleged misconduct there was a requirement for fair procedures to be followed where such an allegation of misconduct was made. The defendants’ position was that, as they have given an undertaking to the Court pending the final determination of the claim not to dismiss the plaintiff on the ground of misconduct, the fair procedures principles did not apply to this interlocutory application. Counsel for the defendants noted that between the interlocutory motion hearing and the trial of the action, the company would only be entitled to terminate the employee’s employment in accordance with contractual terms, including any implied term of reasonable notice. It was noted by the defendants that no claim was being made by the plaintiff that the company was precluded from terminating his employment in accordance with express or implied contractual terms. 

Miss Justice Finlay Geoghegan agreed with the defendants’ arguments. She noted that while the plaintiff had raised a serious issue (the first leg in the Campus Oil injunction principles) in relation to whether the company could terminate his employment on foot of the meeting of 11 December 2013 (alleged misconduct), he had not raised a serious issue in relation to whether the company had an entitlement at common law to terminate his employment in accordance with the relevant contractual provisions. Miss Justice Finlay Geoghegan stated that the fact that the defendants previously threatened to dismiss for the reasons set out in the meeting of 11 December 2013 did not preclude them from terminating the plaintiff’s employment in accordance with contractual provisions. 

The injunctive applications were dismissed in circumstances where the defendants had given an express undertaking not to dismiss the plaintiff on the ground of misconduct, including the matters raised in the meeting of 11 December 2013 and the Facebook issue pending the trial of the matter.

The comments of Miss Justice Finlay Geoghegan in this judgement are noteworthy as it appears that it is open to an employer, even where a disciplinary procedure has been commenced, to abandon these procedures and proceed to dismiss an employee on a ‘no fault’ basis, provided this is done in accordance with the relevant contractual provisions. 

Full decision:
http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IEHC/2014/H146.html