Representative for the respondent objected to the case proceeding on the basis that the claim was res judicata, an identical case having been heard before a Rights Commissioner. The Equality Officer found that there was nothing in the Employment Equality Acts to prevent a claim being pursued under both it and the Maternity Protection Acts.

The Court considered the case before each forum and found that they were clearly grounded on the same facts. The doctrine of res judicata normally prohibits a party from seeking to litigate the same issue twice. In other words, the cause of action in the earlier action must be the same as that raised in the second action for the res judicata or cause of action estoppel to apply. The Court quoted Paul A. McDermott (Butterworth 1999, at p57) in this regard and considered Gilroy v McLoughlin [1989] ILRM 133, Dublin Corporation v Building and Allied Trades Union [1996] 2ILRM547 and Cunningham v Intel Ireland Ltd [2013 IEHC 207.

The Court stated that the only question arising in this case is whether the complainant was returned to the job that she held before the commencement of her maternity leave and that that issue had already been the subject of proceedings before the Rights Commissioner where the complainant was successful and received redress in the form of compensation. The complainant “cannot use the present proceedings to obtain an additional or better remedy for what is undoubtedly the same wrong for which she already has been compensated”.

The Court, even though it did not believe that additional points were being taken in the proceedings before it, also addressed the matter of abuse of process by fragmenting litigation stating that where a point of law or fact should have been raised in the first case and was not, it cannot be raised in the second case. I assume that this refers to the two claims before the different fora in accordance with different legislation, i.e. the Rights Commissioner and the claim before the Equality Tribunal / Labour Court. It would not appear appropriate to interpret this as distinguishing between the hearings at the Tribunal and the subsequent appeal at the Labour Court as those are de novo hearings and new issues and evidence are often presented at that stage.

The Court found that any cause of action that the complainant may have had in these proceedings were merged in and extinguished by the Decision under the Maternity Protection Act 1994.

Why is this case of interest:
• Section 101 of the Employment Equality Acts deals with alternative avenues of redress but does not preclude separate claims under the Maternity Protections Acts. This decision shows, however, that where the causes of action are found to be the same then the cause of action estoppel will apply.

• However, where the causes of action can be distinguished then the rationale in this decision may not apply.
• A further consideration, not addressed in the Recommendation, is whether the res judicata estoppel applies in its full rigour where the rights being considered arise from two different EU Directives.