The complainant’s husband was employed by the respondent as Head of Maintenance and was involved in an employment dispute with his employer. His membership of the respondent’s leisure club was cancelled in June 2012. On 6 September 2012 the complainant received a letter informing her that the membership she held was no longer. Effectively, she could no longer receive the preferential rate of membership she enjoyed as a family member of an employee. The complainant took out a full membership (full fee) the following Monday and after her workout her fee was returned to her and she was told “they just don’t want you in the building”.The complainant could no longer attend karate functions for her daughters that take place in the respondent premises.

The respondent did not attend the hearing although notice had been signed for. The complainant complained of discrimination on the Civil Status ground and victimisation. The complainant’s husband gave direct evidence that he informed his employer he intended initiating proceedings under the Employment Equality Acts and under the Equal Status Acts, the latter because his gym membership was cancelled.

The Equality Officer found that the complainant was not discriminated against because she was married per se, that is because of her Civil Status, but because she was married to Mr. Palmer and that this amounted to discrimination by association as defined by section 3(1)(b).

By association requires that a person is treated less favourably by virtue of an association with another person. The second leg of the provision requires that that other person would have been similarly treated on any of the discriminatory grounds.

The Equality Officer stated: “Victimisation in the Equal Status Acts … differs from the victimisation under the Employment Equality Act in that it is actually a discriminatory ground” as defined in section 3(2)(j). The Equality Officer found there was no reason other than a discriminatory reason to exclude the complainant and that she had established a prima facie case which the respondent had utterly failed to rebut. She stated “I have no doubt that the respondent intentionally embarrassed Ms Palmer by dissolving her membership as a way of retaliating against her husband”.

The maximum award permitted when the complaint was lodged was €6,349 and the complainant was awarded €4000. To be clear, what was upheld was discrimination by association and not discrimination on the civil status ground or victimisation.

Why is this case of interest? It takes a rare look at the provisions relating to the ‘by association’. It is the unusual construction of the Equal Status Acts where victimisation is included as a ground that is particularly relevant as the Equality Officer found that the complainant’s husband’s informing his employer of his intention to take a case under the Equal Status Acts was relevant.